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This article investigates the effect of threats to property rights on the performance of the 
manufacturing sector of Indian states. We construct indices of threats to property rights 
from the data available on crime against property rights and, using these indices, we 
show that not only threats to private property, but also threats to contracts adversely 
affect the performance of the manufacturing sector in India. 
Property rights in the broad sense include all rights having property value. In terms 
of its effects on economic performance, two specific types of property rights are 
important to consider. The first involves property right in the narrow sense, that is, the 
right to utilize and dispose of private property. The second is so-called “claim,” which is 
the right to claim a certain act from another as specified in a contract. Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005) refer to institutions that protect property rights with respect to private 
property as “property right institutions,” and the institutions that protect property rights 
with respect to contracts as “contracting institutions.” 
Citizens’ property rights are threatened by many, including monarchs (kings and 
emperors), lords, aristocrats, dictators, politicians, government officials, enterprises, 
organized crime cartels, and thieves. In order to protect property rights, not only the 
enactment of property right laws, but also the enforcement of such laws must be assured. 
 1Since institutions that protect property rights are a kind of public good, a free rider 
problem may occur, and therefore governments typically supply such institutions. Thus, 
effective institutions such as the police and judicial system must be established by a 
government so that an individual who violates another’s property right is brought to 
justice and damages are paid. Such institutions are also expected to prevent crimes 
against property rights. 
In a society where private property and contracts are protected, entrepreneurs will, 
in all likelihood, acquire profits which they can duly expect to receive through corporate 
activities and use these profits for their own benefits. In such a society, entrepreneurs 
are expected to engage vigorously in corporate activities. Conversely, in a society where 
private property or contracts are not protected, even if entrepreneurs were to invest in 
physical assets, these might be destroyed by others, or even if pecuniary profits were 
acquired, they might be confiscated or stolen. Or, even if entrepreneurs entered into 
contracts with others, the contracts might not be fulfilled. Vibrant corporate activities 
cannot, therefore, be expected in such an economy. 
Even though there exists a large body of literature in which the effects of property 
right protection are statistically analyzed, many previous studies have utilized indices 
based on assessments by experts or questionnaire responses from business people, or 
 2some refined mixture of various indices from different organizations. Those indices may 
suffer several problems. First, they may reflect subjective perceptions of respondents 
with different personal characters, backgrounds and experiences. Second, there is also 
reasonable doubt about the selection bias of respondents since it is likely that samples 
excluded respondents from small enterprises in rural areas. The extent of property right 
protection may well be lower for small firms (World Bank 2005). Third, measures used 
to construct a property right protection index such as the rule of law may not accurately 
reflect what it is meant to capture because the contents of laws, and social and cultural 
contexts in which laws are implemented, vary from one country to another. 
In this article, in order to address these problems, we avail ourselves of more 
objective data related to property right protection, that is, data on crime against property 
rights. Moreover, we focus on a comparison between Indian states, that is, different 
regions within one country, which enables us to obtain a sample that is under identical 
legislation. 
Here, we extend Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) study in which they examined the 
effects of property right institution and contracting institution on various economic 
performances. They showed that the property right institution, not the contracting 
institution, has significant impacts on economic performance; however, their study also 
 3faces the same aforementioned problems concerning the objectivity of data. Since our 
data on crime is classified into various types of crime, we are able to more precisely 
separate the respective effects of property right institution and contracting institution in 
our examination. 
We estimate the effects of two different indices related to threats to property rights 
on three economic performance variables of the state manufacturing sector for the 
period from 1980 to 2000. We obtain estimation results showing that not only threats to 
private property, but also threats to contracts adversely affect India’s manufacturing 
sector. Our results confirm Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) finding that the effects of 
property right institutions impact on economic performance, but, importantly, we also 
show that threats to contracts have deleterious effects on economic performance. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. We briefly review the relevant 
literature in section 2. We then explain our empirical formulation in section 3. Section 4 
provides information about data sources and the method of variable construction. Our 




 42. Previous studies 
There exist two strands of research related to this study. Detailed studies by economic 
historians on the effect of property right protection on economic development date back 
at least to North and Thomas (1973). Their pioneering work explains the difference in 
the historical paths that Western European nations traced from the 10th to the 17th 
centuries, using the analytical framework of transaction cost economics. They claim that 
during the period from 1500 to 1700, the Netherlands and Britain, where property right 
protection was secured to a greater degree, achieved economic development, while 
France and Spain, where the property right system was undeveloped, stagnated and fell 
behind. Landes (1998) considers a variety of historical factors that have divided rich and 
poor countries, and asserts that the assurance of property rights is one of the important 
determinants of economic prosperity. He insists that protection of private property rights 
and respect for contracts were critical factors that enabled Britain to grow in advance of 
other countries. Moreover, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002) compare the processes 
of economic development of South and North America since the Europeans colonized 
the regions. They assert that the difference in climate and resource distribution between 
the two regions initially gave rise to a bigger inequality of wealth, human resources, and 
statesmanship in South American nations than in North American nations. As a result, 
 5political and economic systems that tend to preserve the privilege of the elite have been 
maintained, compared with more equal North America. The access of non-elites to 
critical resources including ownership of land, which is a most important property right, 
as well as education, finance, and political rights has been restricted, which retarded 
economic development in South America.   
From the mid-1990s a new line of empirical research has examined the effect of 
property right protection on economic performance, mostly using cross-country data. 
The present article belongs to this latter line of research. Knack and Keefer (1995), 
using country risk indices provided by International Country Risk Guide and Business 
Environmental Risk Intelligence, show that the average value of various 
indices—including the index related to the level of property right protection 
(expropriation risk and rule of law)—have statistically significant influence on 
investments and growth rates. Hall and Jones (1999) show that the level of so-called 
social infrastructure significantly explains the difference in national income per capita. 
They constructed one of the two indices of social infrastructure, again from the 
International Country Risk Guide, and it partly reflects the degree of property right 
protection. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (1999) aggregated indices from a 
variety of data that was collected and estimated by various organizations, and show that 
 6the indices for the level of governance explain income per capita, mortality rate, and 
literacy rate. The indices include six measures, one of which, the rule of law, is closely 
related to the protection of property rights. 
However, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) were critical of previous 
studies, asserting that they had not properly addressed the endogeneity problem. 
Accordingly, they adopted an innovative method in which they used malaria mortality 
rate as an instrumental variable for the protection of property rights. They show that the 
nations where Europeans settled due to low mortality rates had established property 
right systems and achieved economic development even after the regions became 
independent states. Moreover, using urbanization rates in 1500 as an instrumental 
variable for the low level of property right protection, they show in a later work (2002) 
that nations with low protection of property rights have lower economic growth. Rodrik 
and Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) also obtained estimation results that the presence of 
institutions covering property right protection was the most important determinant of 
economic development, relative to two other important candidate determinants, namely, 
trade and geography.
i  
Along this line of research, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) investigated the separate 
effects of property right institution and contracting institution on economic performance. 
 7They captured the former using “constraints on executives (from Polity IV),” “average 
protection against risk of expropriation (from Political Risk Service),” and “private 
property index (from Heritage Foundation 1997),” and the latter using “legal formalism 
(from Djankov et al. 2003),” “procedural complexity (from World Bank 2004),” and 
“number of procedures (World Bank 2004).” They show that it is only property right 
institutions, not contracting institutions, that have a positive and significant effect on 
economic performance.
ii 
In the Indian context, to our best knowledge, there exist only two studies along this 
line. Veeramani and Goldar (2005) made use of the Firm Analysis and Competitiveness 
Survey (FACS) data constructed by the World Bank, which examines the effects of the 
business climate of each state, and show that productivity level is higher in those states 
with good indicators of business climate. Although FACS does not directly inquire into 
property right protection, we suppose that the index of business climate in their study at 
least partially reflects the respondents’ perception of property right protection. Chemin 
(2004) focused on the effects of the quality of the judiciary on various economic 
phenomena related to small-scale firms. He shows that as judicial processes take longer 
to complete, there are more breaches of trust, fewer relation-specific investments, and 
worse growth performance of firms. He focused, however, only on threats to contracts, 
 8not on threats to private property. We pay attention to both threats in this study. 
As mentioned in section 1, many previous studies utilized indices based on 
questionnaire responses from business people or assessments by experts (e.g., 
International Country Risk Guide, Business Environmental Risk Intelligence, Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey). These indices suffer at least three 
problems. First, the perception by respondents may vary from one person to another due 
to differences in personal characters, backgrounds and experiences. In this article, we 
attempt to address this problem by directly using the data on crime against property 
rights with the expectation that our indices will be more objective than the subjective 
perception of respondents used in previous studies. Second, while many studies have 
used the rule of law index as an indicator for property right protection in cross-country 
analysis, we believe the index may be less than accurate in cross-country comparisons 
since the content of law and the culture in which the law is enforced differs between 
countries. By focusing on one nation, India, we can base our statistical analysis on a 
sample which is under an identical system of laws. And third, as is reported by the 
World Bank (2005), the extent of property right protection differs depending on 
categories of firms, for instance, the size of firms. Questionnaire-based data might not 
precisely capture the business environments faced by small firms. By using crime data, 
 9we can capture more general threats to property rights faced by people in a region. 
Furthermore, there is some vagueness associated with the interpretations of the 
variables in Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). For instance, while they use “constraints on 
executives (from Polity IV)” as the index for property right institution, other agents 
such as organized crime cartels or thieves (dacoits) and other criminal elements also 
threaten property rights. They use “legal formalism (from Djankov et al. 2003)” as the 
index for contracting institutions, but the inefficient legal system may make 
compensation for damage to private property difficult to obtain, thus becoming a threat 
to private property. Fully availing ourselves of a more finely classified crime data would 
enable us more directly to separate out the threats to property rights into threats to 
private property and those to contracts. We propose that our indices will provide clearer 
measures of property right institution and contracting institution than those used by 
Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). 
 
 
3. Empirical formulation 
The level of materialistic well-being of a nation can be roughly captured by per capita 
GDP, which has also been shown to be closely correlated with social development 
 10indicators. In this study, we pay attention to the effect of threats to property rights on 
value added per worker (in log terms) as our primary focus. It is known that a constant 
returns to scale Cobb-Douglass production function 
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where Y is value added, K is capital, L is labor and A is total factor productivity. Thus, 
we also examine the decomposed effects of threats to property rights on log capital 
labor ratio, and log total factor productivity.   
Our basic estimation model is as follows. 
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Here, Zit is the natural log of economic performance variables of the manufacturing 
 11sector of state i in year t, X is the variable indicating the extent of threats to property 
right, and Y is the vector of control variables which may influence the economic 
performance of the manufacturing sector of each state. All these independent variables 
in X and Y are expressed in natural log terms. State dummy   i and year dummy   t are 
included in the estimation. 
We construct two types of variables that capture threats to property rights in each 
state. The first is expected to reflect threats to private property and is constructed from 
the value of property stolen, normalized by gross state domestic product (GSDP) of 
each state. The second is expected to reflect the threats to contracts and is constructed 
from the incidence of cheating, normalized by the population of each state. Since 
citizens’ perception of the threats to property rights is supposed to change only slowly, 
we use, as explanatory variables, the average of these two variables over the last three 
years, including the current year. The former variable is denoted as vpstolen and the 
latter as cheat hereafter. 
Based on earlier studies, we adopt three types of controls: physical infrastructure, 
human capital, and financial resources. Since variables which reflect each category tend 
to be correlated, we choose one or two variables from each category. In this study, we 
use electricity sales per person (electricity) and road length per person (road) to 
 12represent physical infrastructure, primary school enrollment rates (pschool) and the 
incidence of labor disputes per worker (disp) to represent human resources, and the 
number of bank branches per person (bank) to represent financial resources. 
First, we conduct the estimation using the panel data estimation method, with both a 
fixed effects model and a random effects model. We then apply instrumental variable 
estimation to address the endogeneity problem. 
 
 
4. Data and variable construction 
We will examine the effects of threats to property rights on three economic performance 
measures. First, value added per worker is obtained by dividing deflated value added by 
the number of workers. Second, capital labor ratio is calculated by dividing real capital 
stock by the number of workers.   
Third, in order to obtain total factor productivity (TFP, hereafter), we first estimate 
a Cobb-Douglas production function having log real value added as a dependent 
variable and log real capital stock and log number of workers as independent variables, 
using fixed effects panel data estimation. We then insert the estimated coefficients back 
into the production function and subtract the coefficients times the independent 
 13variables from the log dependent variable so as to obtain log TFP.   
We also control for other variables that may affect performance of the 
manufacturing sector of each state. The data sources and the construction of these 
control variables are explained in the Appendix. Since these variables are not expected 
to affect economic performance immediately, we take into account a one year lag of 
these variables in the estimation. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used are provided in Table 1. It can be seen 
that there are wide variations in the variables among the Indian states. Pairwise 
correlations among the variables are shown in Table 2. The correlations between bank 
and electricity and between bank and road are somewhat high, but there are no other 
notable correlations. 
INSERT Table 1 Here 
INSERT Table 2 Here 
Table 3 presents data on the time trends of variables. From this table it is seen that 
electricity, road, pschool, bank, and cheat all have more or less steadily increased and 
disp decreased throughout the period, while vpstolen has not necessarily shown stable 
trend. The changes in vpstolen and cheat are traced in Figures 1 and 2. From Figure 1 it 
can be seen that the trend in vpstolen was rather volatile; after a steep hike in 1980, 
 14there was a downward trend in the 1980s, followed in the earlier part of the 1990s by 
upward movement, which was maintained steadily at a lower level thereafter. Figure 3 
is a scatter diagram with cheat averaged over the sample period on the horizontal axis 
and vpstolen averaged over the sample period on the vertical axis, where each point in 
the diagram corresponds to a state. This figure shows no clear correlation between cheat 
and vpstolen. 
INSERT Table 3 Here 
INSERT Figure 1 Here 
INSERT Figure 2 Here 
INSERT Figure 3 Here 
Table 4 shows statewise values of the independent variables averaged over the 
sample period. The results reconfirm the large variations between the Indian states. 
People in the state with the highest value of cheat may face threats of cheating about 
seven times more often than those in the state with the lowest count. Similarly, the 
highest value of vpstolen is about four times as high as the lowest value. We see that in 
terms of vpstolen, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat face comparatively more 
threats, while Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar have relatively more secure 
protection of property rights with respect to private property. In terms of cheat, in Orissa, 
 15West Bengal and Bihar the incidence of cheating is low, while it is high in Rajasthan, 
Kerala, and Gujarat. 
INSERT Table 4 Here 
 
5. Estimation results 
Panel Estimation Results 
Tables 5 and 6 show the results of our panel data estimation regarding vpstolen and 
cheat for three economic performance variables. The results of the fixed effects model 
estimation are given in Panel A and those of the random effects model in Panel B. The 
hypotheses that all the coefficients are zero are rejected in both models. Standard errors 
are obtained with heteroscedasticity robust estimation, unless otherwise noted at the 
bottom of each table. 
First, we discuss the effects of vpstolen, given in Table 5. The results of the 
Hausman test at the bottom of Table 5 indicate that for all the formulations the random 
effects model is preferred. In any case, the main estimation results are the same for both 
the random and fixed effects models. The coefficients of vpstolen are negative and 
highly significant in columns (1) and (2), though it is not significant in (3); in other 
words, the higher the threats to private property, the lower the gross value added per 
 16worker and capital labor ratio. A 1 percent increase in the threats reduces gross value 
added per worker by 0.07%, and capital labor ratio by 0.05%. 
INSERT Table 5 Here 
Regarding other independent variables, the incidence of labor disputes per worker 
has highly significant negative coefficients in columns (1) and (3), and a positive 
coefficient in column (2). The coefficient of road per person is positive and significant 
in columns (1) and (3). Primary school enrolment rates are shown to have highly 
significant positive effects in column (2), implying that the higher the primary school 
enrolment rate, the more firms are likely to adopt capital intensive technology. This may 
reflect the fact that as the labor becomes more educated, firms are able to use more 
sophisticated, but more expensive, technology. 
Somewhat unexpected results are obtained for electricity consumption per person 
and bank branches per person. Electricity per person has negative coefficients in 
columns (1) and (2), and they are significant depending on the model. The results 
indicate that the higher the electricity consumption per person, the lower the gross value 
added per worker and capital labor ratio. The coefficients on bank per person are 
negative in columns (1), (2) and (3), and are mostly significant. We suspect these results 
are attributable to intervention by both the central and state governments in the financial 
 17and power sectors. The Government of India has taken special measures to promote 
agriculture and small-scale industries. For instance, since 1980, banks have been 
requested to lend 40% of bank credit to priority sectors, out of which 40% should be 
directed to agriculture. The Government of India has traditionally given priority to rural 
electrification in efforts to promote agriculture. These policy measures may have 
produced the counterintuitive estimation results here. 
Next, we discuss the effects of cheat on economic performance. Table 6 presents 
our estimation results. Cheat shows no significant effects. If cheat can be considered a 
threat to contracts, this result is in accordance with Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) 
results that show contracting institutions have no significant negative effects except for 
market capitalization to GDP ratio.
iii 
As regards the other variables, the estimation results are more or less the same, so 
explanations are not necessary. The one notable finding is that primary school 
enrolment rate in Table 6 has a significant positive coefficient in column (3) in Panel B; 
this result is as expected since higher education is supposed to bring about higher 
productivity. 
INSERT Table 6 Here 
In summary, the panel data estimation shows that threats to private property have 
 18adverse effects on gross value added per worker, capital labor ratio and total factor 
productivity, while threats to contracts do not. 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimation Results 
There is reasonable doubt about the endogeneity between economic performance and 
incidence of crime. One possible relationship is that when the income level of people is 
so low, the poor may steal others’ property simply for survival, or they are inclined to be 
engaged in contract crime for money. Another possibility is that, as the income of 
people increases on average, the expected return to crime may be higher because there 
are greater numbers of affluent people in society; people tend to commit more crime in 
a rich society.
iv 
In order to address this problem, we conduct instrumental variable (IV, hereafter) 
estimation using the number of policemen per person in each state as the IV. The 
number of policemen per person may have some correlation with the incidence of 
crimes, while the variable may not impact economic performance, except through its 
effect on the incidence of crime. 
 
Value of property stolen. Table 7 presents the estimation results for vpstolen. Panel A 
 19shows the results of the first stage estimation of vpstolen instrumented by the total 
number of policemen per person. R-squared is 0.1005 and the F-test rejects the 
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. It is shown that the coefficient on the 
instrument is positive and highly significant. The positive sign indicates that as the 
number of policemen per person increases, the greater the number of crimes are 
detected or reported. 
INSERT Table 7 Here 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of the second stage estimation. In column (1) 
where the dependent variable is gross value added per worker, the coefficient of 
vpstolen is negative and significant at the 1% level. The value of the coefficient is 
-0.612, which implies that if vpstolen increases by 1%, gross value added per worker 
declines by 0.61%. This is a surprisingly large effect. 
The coefficient on vpstolen is also negative and significant at the 1% level in 
column (2) where the dependent variable is log capital labor ratio. As vpstolen increases, 
less capital intensive technology is adopted. This result is interpreted as indicating that 
as the threats to private property increase, the less incentive there is for firms to invest 
in physical assets. The coefficient of vpstolen is also negative and significant at the 1% 
level in column (3) where the dependent variable is log total factor productivity. It is 
 20interesting to note that threats to private property adversely affect total factor 
productivity.  
As regards the other explanatory variables, labor disputes per worker have a 
positive effect on capital labor ratio in column (2), which may reflect that, in a state 
with poor industrial relations, firms tend to adopt more capital intensive technology to 
save labor. Labor disputes per worker also have a negative effect on total factor 
productivity, as seen in column (3). Since high productivity can be realized on the basis 
of cooperation between management and labor, the sign of the coefficient is as expected. 
Of note, primary school enrolment rate has a positive coefficient in column (2), 
indicating that as primary school enrolment increases, firms tend to adopt more capital 
intensive technology. This may be due to higher wages or vibrant labor movement in 
highly educated states. Alternatively, it may reflect the fact that as the education level of 
workers increases, firms can use more sophisticated, albeit more expensive, technology 
since higher educated workers can operate them efficiently. 
Electricity per population has negative coefficients in column (2), which is an 
unexpected finding. The number of bank branches per person has negative and highly 
significant coefficients in columns (1), (2) and (3). As discussed in subsection 5-1, we 
suspect that these counterintuitive estimation results are due to government intervention 
 21in the financial and power sectors. 
 
Cheating. We now discuss the estimation results for cheating per person (cheat), which 
is proxied for threats to contracts. First stage estimation results are shown in Panel A of 
Table 8.  As in the case of vpstolen, the total number of policemen per person is 
positive and highly significant. R-squared is lower than in the case of vpstolen, which 
seems to imply that policemen per person is not a good instrument for threats to 
contracts.
v However, since we do not have better instrument for now, and the coefficient 
of the instrument is significant, we continue to use it. 
INSERT Table 8 Here 
Panel B of Table 8 reports the second stage estimation results. The coefficient of 
cheat is negative and significant in columns (1), (2) and (3). Unlike Acemoglu and 
Johnson (2005), we obtained significant negative effects of threats to contracts on 
important economic performance variables. Furthermore, note that its effects are rather 
large. If the incidence of cheating per person rises by 1 percent, then gross value added 
per worker decreases by 1.4%, capital labor ratio declines by 0.97%, and total factor 
productivity falls by 0.77%.   
Not obtaining any significant estimation results, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) 
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changing the terms of their contracts or by developing informal arrangements” 
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2005, p. 984). Their argument is plausible and persuasive. It is 
true that individuals can devise some means to avoid nonfulfillment of contracts or 
hedge the risks associated with them. Nonetheless, it is also true that those individuals 
making a contract under the condition of less certain fulfillment must incur additional 
transaction costs to avoid risk. These additional transaction costs may deter some people 
from making the deal or force others to change the content of the contract to a less 
optimal one. Thus, threats to contracts could plausibly deteriorate economic 
performance. 
Chemin (2004), as mentioned in section 2, finds that as the judiciary process slows, 
the incidence of breach of trust, which should be related to threats to contracts, increases, 
the less relation-specific investment occurs, and economic performance worsens for 
small-scale firms. Our findings are in accordance with Chemin (2004) in the sense that 
contracting institutions are important for economic performance. 
Note also that Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) obtained negative coefficients for 
variables capturing contracting institution, such as legal formalism, procedural 
complexity, and number of procedures, in their Table 2, though they were not 
 23significant. 
As regards the other independent variables, labor disputes per worker have negative 
coefficients in columns (1) and (3), but not (2). Primary school enrolment rate again has 
a positive coefficient in column (2). Bank branches per person continue to have negative 
coefficients in columns (1), (2) and (3). Since these findings are similar to the ones in 
Table 7, the same explanations apply. 
In summary, IV estimation revealed that both threats to private property and threats 
to contracts would have significant adverse effects on gross value added per worker, 





In this article, we estimated the effects of threats to property rights on the performance 
of the manufacturing sector of Indian states. The novelty of our study is the application 
of crime data to capture the extent of threats to property rights in each state. We used 
data on the value of property stolen as the variable related to threats to private property, 
and data on cheating as the variable related to threats to contracts. We conducted panel 
 24data estimation, as well as instrumental variable estimation using total number of 
policemen as an instrumental variable for the variables related to property right 
protection. Our IV estimation results indicate that not only threats to private property, 
but also threats to contracts would have significant adverse effects on the economic 
performance of the manufacturing sector of Indian states. 
While our conclusion is generally consistent with the results obtained by Acemoglu 
and Johnson (2005), we also show the importance of protection of property rights with 
respect to contracts. We argue that while Acemoglu and Johnson’s (2005) claim that 
individuals themselves can avoid threats to contracts is plausible, the additional 
transaction costs required to fend off threats to contracts could deteriorate the outcome 
of the transaction or even hamper completion of the transaction itself. Thus, aggregate 
economic performance may be worse. 
 
 
Appendix: Data sources and construction of variables 
 
We use data on the manufacturing industries from EPW Research Foundation's 
Annual Survey of Industries 1973-74 to 1997-98 in India’s 15 main states for the period 
 25from 1979 to 1997. We exclude "gas, water, and electricity" from the category of the 
manufacturing industries in order to combine with new data from the Annual Survey of 
Industries for the period from 1998 to 2000 that is available on the Central Statistical 
Organisation's (CSO) website. Definitions of the main variables are as follows. 
Real Gross Value Added (GVA): We obtain GVA by the double-deflation method as 
follows: GVA= (gross value of output)/(wholesale price index)-(total input)/(input price 
index). The depreciation stated in the Annual Survey of Industries is not necessarily the 
real value since it is linked to a firm's tax obligation and accounting practices. Thus, the 
gross term including depreciation as the measure of output is better than the net term 
excluding depreciation. Gross value of output is deflated by its wholesale price in order 
to obtain the real value. We construct the input price series. Input price is the weighted 
average of fuel price, material price, and other input prices, and its weights are drawn 
from fuel consumed, material consumed, and other input as stated in the Annual Survey 
of Industries. Fuel price, material price and other input prices are also constructed using 
wholesale prices, the implicit deflator of national account statistics, and weight from the 
input-out table. The data sources we use for constructing the input price index are as 
follows: Reserve Bank of India, Database on Indian Economy, and Handbook of 
Statistics on Indian Economy; CSO, Input-Output Transaction Table 1989 and National 
 26Account Statistics. 
Capital Stock (K): The fixed capital given in the Annual Survey of Industries is 
evaluated at the end of the reference year and does not contain the value of the 
accumulated depreciation. We employ the perpetual inventory accumulation method for 
making the figure of capital stock. Real gross fixed capital formation I is defined as 
I(t)=(B(t)-B(t-1)+D(t))/P(t)
I, where D is depreciation, B is fixed capital, and P(t)
I is the 
implicit deflator of gross fixed capital formation. Then, we construct a time-series of 







the base year capital stock and is regarded as B(0)+D(0). Finally, assuming that the 
depreciation ratio per year is 5 percent, real net capital stock K is set as K(t)=0.95 K(t)
G.  
Labor Input (L): We use the number of workers as labor input. 
Crime data: The data on value of property stolen and criminal breach of trust in 
each state is derived from Crime in India, published annually by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, the Government of India. 
Electricity: Electricity Sales to Ultimate Consumers is obtained from the CMIE 
publication, Infrastructure. This number is divided by population. 
Road: Data on total road length is available from Basic Road Statistics of India, the 
Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport & Highways, the Government of India. This 
 27number is divided by population. 
School enrolment rates: Both primary school and secondary school enrolment rates 
are available from Selected Educational Statistics, the Ministry of Human Resource 
Development, the Government of India. We use Enrolment Ratio for Classes I-V as 
primary school data. 
Bank branches: The data on the number of branches of scheduled commercial 
banks is obtained from Statistical Tables Relating Banks in India, published by the 
Reserve Bank of India. The number of offices is divided by population. 
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i However, there have also been strong rebuttals against the claims that institutions are 
an ultimate determinant of economic development. Among others, Glaeser, La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2004) were harshly critical of the fact that the institution 
indices used in previous studies are inappropriate in the sense that they are so volatile 
and the instrumental estimation methods are also flawed. Then, they provided the 
estimation result that human capital is more important than the institutions. 
ii They show that contracting institutions have a favorable effect on stock market 
capitalization as a percent of GDP. 
iii We do not test the effect on any variable similar to market capitalization to GDP in 
this article. 
iv  Another important issue is that the number of crimes may be underreported, possibly 
because victims could not expect a fair and efficient judiciary process, or would fear 
revenge from the perpetrators of the crime. However, we do not know how to deal with 
this problem at present. 
v It is reasonable to suppose that some measures of the effectiveness of the judiciary  32
                                                                                                                                                  
process could be a better instrument, but we could not obtain appropriate panel data on 
it. Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable No. of Observations Mean S.D. Min Max
electricity 357 0.244 0.163 0.031 0.907
road 357 2.723 1.357 0.262 7.541
disp 344 0.000277 0.000195 0.000009 0.001218
pschool 352 98.9 18.2 58.4 152.6
bank 357 0.074 0.022 0.025 0.141
cheat 357 0.03192 0.02050 0.00954 0.12489
vpstolen 344 0.00088 0.00061 0.00003 0.00578
Notes.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: the number of labor disputes per worker
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: the number of bank branches per person.
cheat: the incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.
Primary school enrolment rates for Jammu& Kashmir, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, 
Punjab and West Bengal in 1989 are missing.Table 2. Unconditional Correlations
electricity road disp pschool bank cheat vpstolen
electricity 1
road -0.0171 1
disp -0.3507 0.0931 1
pschool 0.23 0.2224 -0.1096 1
bank 0.4556 0.4017 -0.1987 0.3034 1
cheat 0.3195 -0.0202 -0.1098 -0.0229 0.1401 1
vpstolen 0.1471 0.0865 -0.1004 -0.0034 0.0063 0.0724 1
Notes.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: the number of labor disputes per worker
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: the number of bank branches per person.
cheat: the incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.Table 3. Time Trends of Variables
year electricity road disp pschool bank cheat vpstolen
1980 0.1295 2.5692 0.000566 87.8706 0.0578 0.0248021 0.0013617
1981 0.1380 2.5823 0.000460 88.6412 0.0623 0.0252457 0.0009744
1982 0.1425 2.5590 0.000390 92.4118 0.0650 0.0241056 0.0009207
1983 0.1495 2.5660 0.000391 95.1588 0.0692 0.0264887 0.0007802
1984 0.1605 2.6340 0.000359 98.7647 0.0718 0.0248097 0.0008928
1985 0.1712 2.6368 0.000302 96.2059 0.0772 0.0269989 0.0008547
1986 0.1871 2.6663 0.000342 98.2012 0.0765 0.0286701 0.0007686
1987 0.1994 2.5763 0.000301 101.0988 0.0770 0.028068 0.0009809
1988 0.2149 2.7481 0.000279 102.6465 0.0762 0.0279448 0.0008398
1989 0.2321 2.7902 0.000276 105.1500 0.0772 0.0289403 0.0006719
1990 0.2469 2.7354 0.000288 103.7453 0.0788 0.0279468 0.0008679
1991 0.2616 2.7389 0.000261 105.1159 0.0788 0.0321375 0.0009758
1992 0.2726 2.7477 0.000237 107.6118 0.0778 0.0329753 0.0010607
1993 0.2876 2.7356 0.000220 107.4706 0.0772 0.0342911 0.0008342
1994 0.3055 2.7216 0.000157 105.9118 0.0767 0.0357991 0.000979
1995 0.3222 2.8586 0.000146 106.7118 0.0759 0.0342544 0.0009732
1996 0.3237 2.9206 0.000160 92.4529 0.0754 0.0373933 0.000777
1997 0.3339 2.9020 0.000168 92.5353 0.0738 0.0392822 0.0008146
1998 0.3478 2.9360 0.000164 94.9094 0.0735 0.0415272 0.0007499
1999 0.3525 2.7946 0.000165 96.9741 0.0734 0.044694 0.0007822
2000 0.3512 2.7689 0.000144 98.8800 0.0728 0.0439009 0.0006936
Notes.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: the number of labor disputes per worker
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: the number of bank branches per person.
cheat: the incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.Table 4. Statewise Average Values of Variables
state electricity road disp pschool bank cheat vpstolen
Orissa 0.147 6.061 0.000477 95.870 0.058 0.0125 0.000944
West Bengal 0.145 0.990 0.000274 108.540 0.055 0.0161 0.000488
Bihar 0.089 1.012 0.000279 78.709 0.050 0.0177 0.000512
Himachal Pradesh 0.200 4.861 0.000329 110.854 0.122 0.0232 0.000729
Assam 0.057 2.909 0.000220 100.689 0.044 0.0235 0.000858
Madhya Pradesh 0.212 2.342 0.000230 95.275 0.058 0.0248 0.000846
Uttar Pradesh 0.131 1.470 0.000147 76.677 0.055 0.0252 0.001304
Tamil Nadu 0.320 2.836 0.000283 126.552 0.074 0.0262 0.000546
Punjab 0.595 2.735 0.000174 94.444 0.105 0.0279 0.000993
Jammu & Kashmir 0.182 2.013 0.000135 82.133 0.096 0.0283 0.001074
Andhra Pradesh 0.242 2.352 0.000482 98.884 0.066 0.0311 0.000453
Haryana 0.361 1.638 0.000268 85.246 0.074 0.0366 0.000734
Maharashtra 0.401 3.107 0.000181 119.984 0.068 0.0374 0.001786
Karnataka 0.252 3.010 0.000120 104.407 0.090 0.0376 0.001065
Gujarat 0.437 2.040 0.000310 116.991 0.078 0.0434 0.001124
Kerala 0.185 4.458 0.000292 98.512 0.097 0.0466 0.000870
Rajasthan 0.198 2.459 0.000451 85.630 0.063 0.0846 0.000791
Averages 0.244 2.723 0.000277 98.887 0.074 0.0319 0.000882
Notes.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: the number of labor disputes per worker
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: the number of bank branches per person.
cheat: the incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.Table 5. Panel Data Estimation (vpstolen)
(1) (2) (3)












ln vpstolen -0.08593 (-2.32) ** -0.05726 (-2.31) ** -0.0479993 (-1.38)
ln disp (-1) -0.04786 (-1.7) * 0.043569 (3.04) *** -0.0625323 (-2.47) **
ln electricity (-1) -0.26884 (-1.92) * -0.3841 (-4.57) *** 0.0169862 (0.13)
ln road (-1) 0.110894 (1.96) * 0.058956 (1.05) 0.0859404 (1.87) *
ln pschool (-1) 0.285734 (2.04) ** 0.367928 (4.5) *** 0.1276569 (0.95)
ln bank (-1) -0.85371 (-3.34) *** -0.49759 (-2.88) *** -0.6562009 (-2.76) ***
R^2 0.0243 0.3167 0.0702
F 13.19 (0) 167.84 (0) 6.24 (0)
Panel B:
Random Effects Model
ln vpstolen -0.07391 (-2.01) ** -0.05072 (-1.89) * -0.0478396 (-1.39)
ln disp (-1) -0.05537 (-2.04) ** 0.040654 (2.6) *** -0.0681409 (-2.82) ***
ln electricity (-1) -0.05836 (0.5) -0.27439 (-3.41) *** 0.2450019 (2.34) **
ln road (-1) 0.117805 (1.93) ** 0.06185 (1.05) 0.0460737 (1.13)
ln pschool (-1) 0.257948 (1.79) * 0.327229 (3.77) *** 0.2513291 (1.78) *
ln bank (-1) -0.53919 (-2.72) *** -0.31163 (-1.97) ** -0.737098 (-3.24) ***
R^2 0.0887 0.3889 0.3756
Wald Chi^2 318.59 (0) 3202.49 (0) 146.76 (0)
Hausmann
Chi^2 1.47 (1) 2.83 (1) 1.91 (1)
No. of obs. 282 282 282
Note:
*** indicates 1% significance level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
Numbers in parentheses are t values for fixed effects model and z values for random effects model.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: the number of labor disputes per worker
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: the number of bank branches per person.
cheat: the incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.Table 6. Panel Data Estimation (cheat) 
(1) (2) (3)












ln cheat 0.033042 (0.66) -0.01068 (-0.27) 0.0702587 (1.59)
ln disp (-1) -0.06021 (-2.48) ** 0.044522 (3.00) *** -0.0782265 (-3.62) ***
ln electricity (-1) -0.2798 (-2.51) ** -0.36997 (-3.80) *** -0.0088861 (-0.09)
ln road (-1) 0.134464 (2.00) ** 0.069536 (1.14) 0.1196793 (2.00) **
ln pschool (-1) 0.327729 (2.71) *** 0.430417 (4.87) *** 0.1092852 (1.02)
ln bank (-1) -0.46669 (-2.18) ** -0.48277 (-2.76) *** -0.1318144 (-0.69)
R^2 0.0966 0.3992 0.0603
F 13.17 (0) 165.92 (0) 5.47 (0)
Panel B
Random Effects Model
ln cheat 0.031545 (0.65) -0.01315 (-0.34) 0.0567041 (1.27)
ln disp (-1) -0.06058 (-2.51) ** 0.043798 (2.78) *** -0.0740606 (-3.32) ***
ln electricity (-1) -0.13347 (-1.48) -0.28836 (-3.11) *** 0.1518939 (1.92) *
ln road (-1) 0.130094 (2.06) ** 0.069947 (1.12) 0.0746495 (1.31)
ln pschool (-1) 0.313529 (2.70) *** 0.393705 (4.36) *** 0.2495355 (2.34)* *
ln bank (-1) -0.34335 (-1.96) * -0.35015 (-2.20) ** -0.4487972 (-2.89) ***
R^2 0.1761 0.4508 0.3873
Wald Chi^2 309.71 (0) 3616.37 (0) 127.71 (0)
Hausmann
Chi^2 10.39 (0.9927) 14.06 (0.9453) 25.81 (0.3628)
No. of obs. 307 307 307
Note: The results for gross value added per worker and TFP are without robust option because robust option makes Hausman test unfeasbile.
*** indicates 1% significance level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
Numbers in parentheses are t values for fixed effects model and z values for random effects model.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: the number of labor disputes per worker
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: the number of bank branches per person.
cheat: the incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.Table 7. Two stage least squares estimation (vpstolen)
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent Variable: ln vpstolen
tpolice(-3) 0.460177 ( 0.104033 ) ***
ln disp (-1) -0.0071 ( 0.040254 )
ln electricity (-1) 0.033783 ( 0.197051 )
ln road (-1) -0.02543 ( 0.109682 )
ln pschool (-1) 0.047103 ( 0.209193 )
ln bank (-1) -0.3233 ( 0.398469 )
R^2 0.1005
F(23,241) 2.01 ( 0.0052 )
Panel B: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)









ln vpstolen -0.61164 ( 0.183366 ) *** -0.42184 ( 0.124402 ) *** -0.372504 ( 0.144306 ) ***
ln disp (-1) -0.05166 ( 0.032675 ) 0.041056 ( 0.022168 ) * -0.06495 ( 0.025714 ) **
ln electricity (-1) -0.1959 ( 0.160699 ) -0.33307 ( 0.109024 ) *** 0.0617364 ( 0.126467 )
ln road (-1) 0.07222 ( 0.089551 ) 0.031906 ( 0.060755 ) 0.0622108 ( 0.070475 )
ln pschool (-1) 0.241396 ( 0.168648 ) 0.336446 ( 0.114417 ) *** 0.1007429 ( 0.132723 )
ln bank (-1) -0.96157 ( 0.324512 ) *** -0.57067 ( 0.22016 ) *** -0.723838 ( 0.255384 ) ***
R^2 0.0001 0.2185 0.0122
Wald Chi^2 338.6 (0.0000) 43559.47 (0.0000) 103717.1 (0.0000)
No. of obs. 281 281 281
Notes: *** indicates 1% significance level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp: number of labor disputes per worker.
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: number of bank branches per person.
cheat: incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.
tpolice: total number of policemen per person.Table 8. Two stage least squares estimation (cheat)
Panel A: First Stage
Dependent Variable: ln cheat
tpolice(-3) 0.205894 ( 0.076 ) ***
ln disp (-1) -0.02596 ( 0.03 )
ln electricity (-1) 0.457853 ( 0.148 ) ***
ln road (-1) 0.022638 ( 0.082 )
ln pschool (-1) 0.077558 ( 0.158 )
ln bank (-1) -0.4495 ( 0.286 )
R^2 0.086
F(23,249) 4.99 (0.0000)
Panel B: Second Stage
(1) (2) (3)









ln cheat -1.38552 ( 0.609 ) ** -0.97246 ( 0.413 ) ** -0.7699527 ( 0.415 ) *
ln disp (-1) -0.09199 ( 0.052 ) * 0.017458 ( 0.035 ) -0.095737 ( 0.035 ) ***
ln electricity (-1) 0.454605 ( 0.391 ) 0.120428 ( 0.265 ) 0.4339128 ( 0.267)
ln road (-1) 0.111424 ( 0.136 ) 0.053711 ( 0.092 ) 0.1015756 ( 0.092 )
ln pschool (-1) 0.3169 ( 0.259 ) 0.394304 ( 0.176 ) ** 0.1231771 ( 0.177 )
ln bank (-1) -1.31744 ( 0.532 ) ** -0.94172 ( 0.361 ) *** -0.7004058 ( 0.363 )*
R^2 0.0156 0.272 0.0438
Wald Chi^2 130.87 (0.0000) 18444.57 (0.0000) 57954.92 (0.0000)
No. observations 289 289 289
Notes. *** indicates 1% significance level, ** 5%, and * 10%.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
electricity: electricity sales to ultimate consumers (million KwH) per person.
road: total road length (km) per person.
disp:  number of labor disputes per worker.
pschool: primary school enrollment rate.
bank: number of bank branches per person.
cheat: incidence of cheating per person.
vpstolen: the value of property stolen divided by gross state domestic product.
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